First, there’s the question of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
After months of conflict, Gulf states appear desperate to restore energy exports to replenish depleted state revenues. As a result, many are now willing to contemplate an idea that would have been almost unthinkable only weeks ago: granting Iran a formal role in managing traffic through the critical waterway.
Earlier this week, Oman presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal under which Iran would help administer the strait and collect voluntary fees from vessels using the route.
Iran rejected the proposal, insisting that the entire inbound shipping channel and part of the outbound route should fall under its control, according to an Iranian official.
Washington, for its part, has repeatedly rejected any suggestion that ships should pay tolls or fees to transit the strait.
Yet military realities are steadily narrowing the range of alternatives. U.S. air strikes have so far failed to eliminate Tehran's ability to disrupt shipping while President Donald Trump appears reluctant to embark on a deeper regional war. Under those circumstances, a compromise that gives Iran at least some degree of authority over Hormuz appears increasingly plausible.
An agreement that formalises Iran's influence over the world's most important energy chokepoint would be seen as a big win for Tehran and could carry far-reaching consequences.
The immediate financial impact is pretty clear-cut. A toll system would increase the cost of exporting oil and gas from the Gulf.
The more profound consequence, however, would be psychological.
For decades, Gulf energy supplies had reputations for reliability that allowed producers to command a premium from Asian buyers.
But the war has demonstrated that Iran can disrupt one of the world's most critical trade routes fairly easily using cheap means, such as drones and missiles. Even if shipping resumes and a diplomatic agreement is reached, the threat will continue to hang over the region like a sword of Damocles.
That sword comes with a hefty price tag. If geopolitical risk now needs to be factored into purchasing decisions, Gulf exporters will likely be forced to offer discounts to retain customers even if today’s physical disruptions are cleared.
Signs are already emerging that this is happening.
India's state-owned Mangalore Refinery this week issued a crude purchase tender that, for the first time, explicitly asked suppliers to avoid using the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. This is, in effect, requiring suppliers to continue using more expensive, less efficient routes no matter what happens between the U.S. and Iran in the coming months.
More broadly, Asian and European importers of Middle East liquefied natural gas are planning to seek lower prices and stronger supply guarantees from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, according to buyers, traders and industry executives interviewed by Reuters.
Higher insurance premiums, elevated shipping costs and persistent concerns over supply security may therefore soon become viewed as the cost of doing business in the Gulf.
This new reality may, in turn, force Gulf producers to agree to more bespoke, direct supply deals with importing nations outside today’s highly liquid and efficient market, rendering the energy market more opaque.
In effect, the Middle East may be drifting toward a new equilibrium in which energy continues to flow but under a constant shadow of coercion. The immediate crisis will eventually pass, but the damage to the region's reputation could prove far more enduring.
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